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From the Banktuptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

SECURED CREDITOR'S LIABILITY
FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP COSTS: THE WARNING OF

FLEET FACTORS

When banks and finance companies fmd a borrower's business operations inadequate to sustain repayment of a loan, they tum to collateral
for comfort. When the collateral is
real estate plagued by hazardous
waste contamination, the land may
have little or no salable value. This
risk of being left with valueless collateral is not new to secured lenders,
but-a much more troubling problem
now facing fmancers is the additional risk that secured creditors may
be liable under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) 1 for clean-up costs associated with hazardous wastes created by the debtor.
The Facts of the Case
A recent case decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir* Special Counsel to the law finn of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y. Member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York,
N.Y. Member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1980).

cuit, United States v. Fleet Fact(}rs
Corp., 2 comes to grips with this
problem and presents several caveats to lenders. In 1976, Swainsboro
Print Works (SPW), a cloth-printing facility i entered into a factoring
agreement with Fleet Factors Corp.
under which Fleet"Factors agreed to
advance funds against an assignment of SPW's accounts receivable.
As collateral for these advances,
Fleet Factors obtained a security
interest in SPW' s textile facility and
of all of the equipment, inventory
and fixtures.
SPW filed a petition under chapter 11 in August 1979. The factoring
agreement continued with court approval, but early in 1981, Fleet Factors ceased advancing funds to SPW
because the debt to Fleet Factors
exceeded its own estimate of the
value of SPW's accounts receivable. Shortly thereafter, on February 17, 1981, SPW ceased operations and began liquidating its
inventory. Fleet Factors, however,
continqed to collect the assigned accounts receivable. In December
1981, the case was converted to a
chapter 7 liquidation, and a trustee
assumed control of the facility.
In May 1982, Fleet Factors foreclosed on its security interest in
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9'<>1 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
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for summary judgment with respect
to the liability of the officers and
stockholders for the cost of removing the hazardous waste in the
drums but denied the motion with
respect to the· asbestos removal
costs. Most importantly, the Fleet
Factors motion for summary judgment was also deriied, and Fleet
Factors appealed.

some of SPW's inventory and
equipment, and contracted- with a
liquidator to sell it at an auction. In
June, the collateral was sol4 ''as is''
and "in place" ·so tliat removal of
the items was the responsibility of
the purchasers. In August, Fleet
Factors allegedly contracted with
Nix Riggers to remove the unsold
equipment in consideration for leaving the premises "broom clean. " 3
Nix testified in a deposition that he
was given a free hand by Fleet or
the liquidator to do whatever was
necessary at the facility to remove
the machinery and ~uipment. Nix
left the facility at the end of 1983.
EPA Inspection
In January 1984, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 4
inspected the facility and found 700
55-gallon drums containing toxic
chemicals and 44 truckloads of material containing asbestos. In responding to the environmental
threat at SPW, the EPA incurred
costs of $400,000. The facility was
conveyed to Emanuel County,
Georgia, at a foreclosure sale in July
1987 resulting from SPW's failure
to pay state and county taxes.
The government sued the two
principal officers and stockholders
of SPW as well as Fleet Factors to
recover the costs of cleaning up the
hazardous waste. The district court
granted the government's motion

Court of Appeals
The ~ourt of appeals observed
that CERCLA was enacted by Congress in response to the environmental and· public health hazards
caused by the improper disposal
of hazardous waste, and that the
' 'essential policy'' underlying
CERCLA was to place the ultimate
responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on ''those responsible
for problems caused by the disposal
1
of chemical poison.' ' 5 To carry out
such responsibility, CERCLA authorizes the federal government -to
clean up hazardous waste sites and
recover the costs from certain categories of responsible parties:

3

3
901 F.2d at 1553.
• See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(2): "The term
'administrator' means the Administrator of
the United States Environmental Protection
Agency."
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The parties liable for costs incurred
by the government in responding
to an environmental hazard are: ( 1)
the present owners and operators
of a facility where hazardous
wastes-were released or are in danger of being released; (2) the owners or operators of a facility at the
time the hazardous wastes were
disposed; (3) the person or entity
that arranged for the treatment or
disposal of substances at _the facili'901 F.2d at 1553.
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ty; and (4) the person or entity that
transported the substances to the
facility. 6

The government's position was
that Fleet Factors was liable for the
response costs associated with the
waste at the SPW facility as either a
present owner and operator of the
facility 7 or the owner or operator of
the facility at the time that the wastes
were disposed. 8 The district court
rejected as a matter of law the government's claim that Fleet Factors
was a present owner of the facility
but found a genuine issue of fact as
to whether Fleet Factors was an
owner or operator of the SPW facility at the time that the wastes were
disposed and, therefore, it denied
Fleet Factors's motion for summary
judgment.
"Present Owner" Construed
Addressing the applicable sections of CERCLA, the court first
discussed 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1),
which holds the owner or operator
of a facility containing ·hazardous
waste liable for expenses incurred
in responding to the environmental
and health hazards·presented by the
6
901 F.2d at 1553-1554. "The term
facility means (A) any building struc'
ture.... "42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
7
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
8 See42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
9
901 F.2d at 1554. See id. at 1554
n.3: "Although the 'owner lilnd operator'
l~nguage of§ 9607(a)(1) is in the conjunc~ve, .we .construe this language in the disJ~nctive m accordance with the legislative
htstory ofCERCLA and the persuasive interpretations of other federal coUrts'' (citations
omitted).
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waste in that facility. The court construed the present owner and opera- .
tor of a facility as the individual
or entity owning -or operating the
facility at the time that the plaintiff
initiated the lawsuit by filing the
complaint.
Reviewing the facts from July 9,
1987, the date that the litigation
commenced, the court found that
the owner of the SPW facility was
Emanuel County, Georgia. Under
CERCLA, however, a state or local
government that has involuntarily
acquired title to a facility generally
is not held liable as the owner or
operator of the facility.
Instead, the statute provides:
[i]n the case of any facility, title or
control of which was conveyed due
to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax deiinquency, abandonment, qr similar
means to a unit of a State or local
government [its owner or operator
is] any person who owned, operated
or oTherwise controlled activities at
such facility imlnediately beforehand.to

The parties disagreed as to the
interpretation of the phrase "immediately beforehand.'' The district
court had held that Fleet Factors
could not be liable under Section
9607(a)(1) because it had never
foreclosed on the facility, and its
agents h~d not been on the premises
since December 1983. The court of
appeals agreed with Fleet Factors
that ''the plain meaning of the
phrase 'immediately beforehand'
10
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
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means without intervening ownership, operationt and control." 11
No Ownership, Operation, or
Control
Accordingly, the court of appeals
held that Fleet Factors could not be
held liable under Section 9607(a)tl)
because it neither owned, operated,
nor controlled SPW immediately
prior to Emanuel County's acquisition of the facility. Thus, from 9ecember'1981, when SPW became a
debtor under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, until the July 1987
foreclosure sale, the bankruptcy estate and trustee were the owners of
the facilicy; Fleet Factors'" involvement with SPW terminated· inore
than three years before the-county
assumed ownership of the facility. ·
The court also observed that it was
of no moment that the bankruptcy
trustee might not have effectively
exercised control of the facility.
"To reach back to Fleet's involvement with the facility prior to December 1983 in order to impose
liability would torture the plain statutory meaning of 'immediately beforehand.' ,_~ 2
Liability is also imposed under
Section 9607(a)(2) of CERCLA on
"any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any . . . facility
at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of." ... " 13 Excluded
from the definition of "owner or
11

901 F.2d at 1555.

l2[d.
13

See also 42l.J.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).

operator" is any "person, who,
without participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia
of ownership primariJy to protect
his security interest in the ... facility. " 14 The court of appeals ,held
that Fleet Factors had the burden of
establishing its entitlement to this
exemption:
There is no dispute that Fleet held an
'indicia of ownership' in the facility
~ through its deed of trust to SPW, and
that this interest was held primarily
to protect its s~urity interest,in the
-facility. ,The critical issue is whether
Fleet participated in management
sufficiently to incur liability under
the statute. 15

Secured Creditor Exception
Observing that the construction
of the "secured creditor exemption" was an issue of first impression in the federal appellate courts,
the court of appeals "rejected ·the
government's prging of a literal:interpretation orthe ,e~~mption- that
would exclude from its protection
any secured creditor that.participates ''in any manner'' in the management of a facility. Such a narrow
l4[d.
15 901 F.2d at 1556 (emphasis added). In
a footnote, the court recognized the distinction between Fleet Factors's possible liability under 42 u.s.c. § 9607(a)(2) as operator
and, alternatively, Fleet Factors's possible
liability by having an indicia 6f ownership
and managing the facility to the extent necessary to remove it from the secured creditor
liability exception. "In order to avoid repetition, and because this case fits more snugly
under a secured creditor analysis,. we will
forego an" analysis of Fleet's liability as an
operator." ld. at 1554 n.6.

423
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interpretation would eradicate the
exemption Congress intended to afford secured creditors, the court
said:
Secured lend~rs frequently. have
some involvement in the fm;mcial
affairs of their debtors in order to
insure that their interests are being
adequately protected. To adopt the
government's interpretation of the
secured creditor exemption could expose all such lenders to CERCLA
liability for engaging in their normal
course of business. 10

Fleet Factors urged the court to
adopt the distinction enunciated by
severa1 district courts between permissible participation in the financia1 management of the facility and
impermissible participation in the
day-to-day or operational management. Such a distinction was made
in United States 'v. Mirabile!' a
decision relied on by the district
court in Fleet Factors. The district
court interpreted the statutory langugage to permit secured creditors
to ''provide financial assistance and
genera], and even isolated instances
of specific, management advice to
its debtors without risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor
does not participate in the day-today management of the business or
facility either before or after the
business ceases operation. ' ' 18

[VOL. 23 : 420 1991]

District Court "Too Permissive"
The district court applied this interpretation to conclude that until
Fleet Factors's liquidator .entered
the facility in June 1982, Fleet Factors's activity did not rise to the
level of participation in management sufficient to impose CERCLA
liability. The district court, however, determined that after Fleet Factors's liquidator entered the facility,
the ·facts alleged by the government
relating to FleetFactors's involvement were sufficient to preclude the
granting of summary judgment in
favorofFleetFactors. Although the
court of appeals agreed with the
district court's decision on the motion for summary judgment, it found
its construction of the statutory secured creditor exemption too permissive toward secured creditors
who are involved with toxic waste
facilities:

16

901 F.2d at 1556.
No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. '4, 1985).
18
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,
724 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Ga. 1988);
accord Guidice v. BFG Electroplating &
Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-562
(W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Nicolet,
712 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
17
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The district court's broad interpretation of the exemption would essentially require a secured creditor to be
involved in the operations of a facility
in order to incur liability. This construction ignores the plain language
of the exemption and essentially renders it meaningless. Individuals and
entities involved in the operations of
a facility are already liable as operators under the express language of
section 9607(a)(2). Had Congress intended to absolve secured creditors
from ownership liability, it would
have done so. Instead, the statutory
language chosen by Congress explicitly holds secured creditors liable if
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they participate in the management
ofafacility. 19

Analyzing the phrase' 'participating in the management" and the
term "operator," the court of appeals observed that, although similar they were not congruent:
Under the standard we adopt todaY,
a secured creditor may incur section
9607(a)(2) liability, without being an
operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to
the degree indicating a capacity to
influence the corporation's treatment
of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor actually
to involve itself in the day-to-day
operations of the facility in order to
be liable-although such conduct will
certainly l~ad to the loss of the protection of the statutory exemption.
Nor is it necessary for the secured
creditor t<rparticipate in management
decisions relating to hazardous
waste. 20
The court of appeals construction
of the secured creditor's exemption
was, as the court indicated, less
permissive than that of the district
court's, yet l,>roader than that urged
by the government. The cQurt stated
that nothing in its decision should
preclude a secured creditor from
monitoring any aspect of a debtor's
business, and moreover, a secured
creditor could become invoJved in
"occasional and discrete fmancial
decisions relating to the protection
of its security interest without incurring liability.' ' 21
19
20
21

901 F.2d at 1557 (emphasis added).
901 F.2d at 1558.

ld. -

No Disincentive for Lenders ·
The court of appeals dismissed as
"unfounded" any concern that the
effect of its interpretation of the
exemption provision for secured
creditors might create disincentives
for lenders to extend financial assistance to businesses with potential
hazardou·s waste problems and
might encourage secured creditors
''to distance themselves from the
management actions, particularly
those
related
to
hazardous
wastes. '' 22 Critics might predict that
the improper treatment of hazardous wastes could be perpetuated,
rather than resolved, as a result of
the decision.
Quite to the contrary, the court
of appeals was confident that its
interpretation of the statute should
encourage potential creditors to
investigate thoroughly the waste
treatment systems and poiicies of
potential debtors. ''If the treatment
systems seem inadequate, the risk of
CERCLA liability will be weighed
irito the terms of the loan agreement. " 23 The court viewed its decision as one that will further the aims
of CERCLA by enlisting the aid of
securedlenders,saying:
[D]ebtors, aware that inadequate
hazardous waste treatment will have
a significant adverse impact on their
loan terms, will have powerful incen22
/d. The court cited Guidice, 732 F.
Supp. at 556, 562; Note, "Interpreting the
Meaning of Lender Management Under Section 101(20)(A) ofCERCLA," 98 Yale L.J.
925, 928, 944 (1989).
23
901 F.2d at 1558.
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tives to improve their handling of
hazardous wastes.
Similarly, creditors' awareness that
they are potentially liable under
CERCLA will encourage them to
monitor the hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their
debtors and insist upon compliance
with acceptable treatment standards
as a prerequisite to continued and
future financial support. . . . Once a
secured creditor's involvement with
a facility becomes sufficiently broad
that it can anticipate losing its exemption from CERCLA liability, it
have a strong incentive to 'address
hazardous waste problems at the facility rather than studiously avoiding
the investigation and amelioration of
the hazard. 24

will

Adequacy of Complaint
In applying its statutory interpretation to the case before it, the court
of appeals agreed with the district
court that th~ goverpment alleged
sufficient facts to hold Fleet Factors
liable. Although Fleet Facto~s'"s
conduct before SPW ceased printing
operations in February 1981 fell
within the 'scope of the secured creditor's exemption, Fleet Fac~ors alleged involvement with SPW increased substantially thereafter
when SPW ceased printing operations and began winding down its
a~fairs. This involvement included
requiring SPW to obtain Fleet Factors's approval before shipping
goods to customers, establishing tlte
price for excess inventory, dictating
when and to whom ~e fmished

goods should be shipped, determining when employees should be laid
off, supervising the activity of the
office administratot:. at the site, receiving and processing SPW's employment and tax forms, controlling
access to the facility, and contracting with a liquidator to dispose
of SPW's fixtures ~d equipment.
Such involvement in fmancial management was ''pervasive, if not
complete" 25 and, if proved, would
be sufficient to place Fleet Factors
outside the protection of CERCLA's secured creditor exemption.
Additionally, the government alleged that Fleet Factors was also
involved in the operational management of the facility: ''Either of these
allegatiOJ!S is sufficient as a matter
of law to impose CERCLA liability
on a secured creditor.' ' 26 As to Fleet
Factors's involvement at the facility
from the time that it contracted with
the liquidator in May 1982 until Nix
left the facility in December 1983,
the court of appeals agreed with the
district court that Fleet Factors's
alleged conduct brought it outside
the secured creditor exemption.
''Indeed, Fleet's involvement
would pass the threshold for operator liability under {CERCLA]. '' 27
Secured Creditor Exemption
.Rejected
Fleet Factors contended that its
activity at the facility from the time
of ·the auction -was within the se25
26

24
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27

901 F.2dat 1558-1559.
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901 F.2d at 1559.
Id.
901 F.2d at 1560.
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cured creditor exemption becaue it
Conclusion
was merely protecting its security
It ~s easy to see why financial
interest in the facility and foreclos- institutions shudder at the court's
ing its security interest in its equip- conclusion that Fleet Factors may
ment, inventory, and ftxtures. Re- be liable under CERCLA'for ''pfirjecting this argument as immaterial, ticipating in the manage~ent'' of
the court reasoned that '' [w]hat is tht? facility. Fleet Factors ~as doing
relevant is the nature and extent of nothing more than protecting its sethe creditor's involvement with the curity interest in its accounts receivfacility, not its motive. To hold oth- able, inventory, and fixtures at a
erwise would enable secured credi- ~time when SPW had ceased optors to take indifferent and irrespon- erating. Nothing in Fleet Factors'
sible actions toward their debtors' conduct was inconsistent with a sale
hazardous wastes with impunity by that would be ~onducted if the colincanting that they were protecting lateral were sold at a foreclosure
tfieir security interests. Congress sale. indeed, the provisions of the
did not intend C~RCLA to sanction Uniform Commercial Code29 prosuch abdication of responsi- vide in part: "Unless otherwise
bility: " 28
agreed a secured party has on deThe court of appeals agreed with fault the right to take possession of
the district court holding that Fleet the collateral. In taking possession a
Factors was not within the class of secured party may proceed without
persons liable as a current owner or judicial process if this can be done
operator under Section 9607(a)(l). without breach of the peace or ~y
Although it found that the district proceed by action.'' Preparing the
court erred in construing the se- collateral for sale after the debtor
cured creditor exemption to protect has ceased operations should not,
Fleet Factors from CERCLA liabil- for CERCLA purposes, constitute
ity for its conduct prior to June 22,. _management or operation of a busi1982, the court of appeals agreed ness even if the lender controls the
with its ruling that Fleet Factors shipping of' goods and supervises
would be liable under Section the activities of the office adminis9607(a)(2) for its subsequent activi- tration at the site to maximize return
ties if the government could estab- on its collateral.
lish its allegations. Since there were
The effect of the Fleet Factors
disputed issues of material fact to decision seems to have aroused the
be decided the case was· remanded concern of fmancial institutions and
to the district court for further pro- has prompted a bill that has been
ceedings consistent with the opinion presented in the House ofRepresentatives to amend CERCLA to limit
ofthe court of appeals.
28

29

/d.
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the liability of lending institutions
and acquiring facilities through
foreclosure or similar means and
corporate fiduciaries administering
estates or trusts. The bill would protect the following from CERCLA
liability:
[A]ny designated lending institution
which acquires ownership or control
of the facility pursuant to the terms
of a security interest held by a person
in that facility. 30

The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has indicated a far30
H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990). [To Amend the Comprehensive En. vironrnental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 to limit the liability
under the Act of lending institutions acquiring facilities through foreclosure or similar
means and porporate fiduciaries administering estates or trusts introduced April4, 1990
and referred to House Energy and Commerce Committee. Bill died in August
1990.]
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reaching definition of management
that may not be followed by other
courts and that may be statutorily
overruled by the enactment ofH.R.
4494. 31 For now, however, the
court has clearly put the burden on
fmancial institutions 'to investigate
the waste treatment systems and policies of potential debtors. "If the
treatment systems seem inadequate
the risk of CERCLA liability will
be weighed into the terms of the
loan agreement.' ' 32
31 Cf. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910
F.2d 668, 673 n.3, (9th Cir. 1990), where
the Ninth Circuit, referring to the holding in
Fleet Factors as it affected the Bergsoe case,
held: ''As did the..Eleventh "Circuit in Fleet
Factors, we hold that a creditor must, as a
threshold matter, exercise actual management authority before it can be held liable
for action-or inaction which results in the
discharge of hazardous wastes. Merely hav:
ing the power to get involved in management, but failing to exercise it, is not
enough."
32 See note 23 supra and accompanying
text.
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